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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION 9-313:
TIME FOR ADOPTION IN CALIFORNIA
The law of fixtures governs valuable property rights, and its practi-
cal importance looms large during periods of economic decline, when
defaults and foreclosures occur with great regularity.1 Thus, any creditor
who desires to take a security interest in goods which could become
fixtures must know his rights and obligations with regard to third parties
who might claim the goods on the basis of their realty interests. If, for
example, A sold B a copy machine on an installment contract and B
subsequently bolted the copy machine to the floor of the office he
leased from C, would A be permitted to remove the copy machine from
B's office after B defaulted on his payments? California case law would
allow A to remove the copy machine,2 but A might not fare so well in
another state.
The Uniform Commercial Code (the Code) was drafted in an at-
tempt to promote conformity among the states in commercial law.3 The
drafters succeeded only in part; although forty-nine states did enact the
Code,4 a review of their statutes reveals approximately five hundred
deviations from the proposed Article 9 alone.5 While many of these
changes are insignificant, those that concern fixtures are fundamental.
1. See Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARv. L. REv. 477, 482 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Coogan]. Professor Grant Gilmore explained: 'There has, of
course, been almost no litigation involved in fixtures for the past thirty years. There
is no reason to believe that there ever will be any such litigation, until, if ever, we suffer
another collapse on a scale that took place in the late 1920's and early 1930's." A Look
at the Work of the Article 9 Review Committee: A Panel Discussion, 26 Bus. LAW.
307, 316 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Panel Discussion]. This seems more probable to-
day then it did in 1970, when the statement was made.
2. Hendy v. Dinkerhoff, 57 Cal. 3 (1880); EAC Credit Corp. v. Bass, 21 Cal.
App. 3d 645, 98 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1971). But see Goldie v. Bauchet Properties, 44 Cal.
App. 3d 184, 118 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1974), hearing granted March 19, 1975. Goldie
is distinguishable from Hendy and EAC, which involved purchase money security inter-
ests. In Goldie, a security interest was taken in a fixture which belonged to the tenant
and which had been previously pledged to the landlord. Uniform Commercial Code sec-
tion 9-313(4) (c) has no application to a secured party who perfects his security interest
after the goods become fixtures.
3. UNIFORM COMMmCIAL CODE, General Comment.
4. Louisiana did not adopt the Uniform Commercial Code. All other states, plus
the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands have enacted the Code. UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, Table 1.
5. Panel Discussion, supra note 1 at 307.
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Ohio, for example, reversed the priorities of the Official Text by favor-
ing prior mortgagees of realty over chattel mortgagees in its section
9-313,6 and Iowa stated that nothing in Article 9 would govern priority
between a security interest in fixtures and the claims of an individual
who had an interest in the real estate. 7 California provided that Article
9 would govern the creation, perfection, and priority of security inter-
ests in fixtures with regard to claimants asserting an interest in the fix-
tures themselves but would not be applicable to claimants asserting an
interest in fixtures as part of the real estate.8 California also omitted
the key fixture provision, section 9-313.9
6. 13 OsIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1309.32(B) (Page Supp. 1973).
7. IowA CODE ANN. § 554.9313 (1967).
8. CAL. COMM. CODE § 91021(c) (West Supp. 1975). The California Bankers
Association proposed this addition to section 9102 to conform to its recommendation
that section 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial COde not be enacted in California. REc-
OMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS OF THE CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASSOCIATION, CALIFORNIA
SENATE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGIS-
LATURE, PART 1-THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, I APPENDIX TO JOURNAL OF THE
SENATE 402, 417 (1961).
9. The original section 9-313 of the Code read:
"(1) The rules of this section do not apply to goods incorporated into a structure
in the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal work and the like and no se-
curity interest in them exists under this Article unless the structure remains personal
property under applicable law. The law of this state other than this Act determines
whether and when other goods become fixtures. This Act does not prevent creation of
an encumbrance upon fixtures or real estate pursuant to the law applicable to real estate.
"(2) A security interest which attaches to goods before they become fixtures takes
priority as to the goods over the claims of all persons who have an interest in the real
estate except as stated in subsection (4).
"(3) A security interest which attaches to goods after they become fixtures is
valid against all persons subsequently acquiring interests in the real estate except as
stated in subsection (4) but is invalid against any person with an interest in the real
estate at the time the security interest attaches to the goods who has not in writing con-
sented to the security interest or disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures.
"(4) The security interests described in subsections (2) and (3) do not take pri-
ority over
(a) a subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the real estate; or
(b) a creditor with a lien on the real estate subsequently obtained by judicial pro-
ceedings; or
(c) a creditor with a prior encumbrance of record on the real estate to the extent
that he makes subsequent advances
if the subsequent purchase is made, the lien by judicial proceedings is obtained, or the
subsequent advance under the prior encumbrance is made or contracted for without
knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected. A purchaser of the real
estate at a foreclosure sale other than an encumbrancer purchasing at his own foreclo-
sure sale is a subsequent purchaser within this section.
"(5) When under subsections (2) or (3) or (4) the secured party has priority
over the claims of all persons who have interests in the real estate, he may, on default,
subject to the provisions of Part 5, remove his collateral from the real estate but he must
reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of the real estate who is not the debtor and who
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
September 1975] UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION 9-313 237
When the Review Committee for Article 9,1° appointed by the
Permanent Editorial Board in 1966, began considering the revisions that
would be necessary if the Code were to become uniform, its attention
focused on the fixtures provisions." In 1968 the committee published its
Preliminary Draft No. 1, which dealt almost exclusively with fixtures,
and included a completely rewritten version of section 9-313.12 The
draftsmen took great pains with the fixtures provisions, responding in
part to voluminous criticisms leveled against the 1962 provisions. 3
Section 9-313 was reworked in a second draft' 4 and further changes
were made before the revised section reached its final form in the 1972
amendments. 15
has not otherwise agreed for the cost of repair of any physical injury, but not for any
diminution in value of the real estate caused by the absence of the goods removed or
by any necessity of replacing them. A person entitled to reimbursement may refuse per-
mission to remove until the secured party gives adequate security for the performance
of this obligation." UNEFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313 (1962).
10. The Committee included John S. Hastings, Sterry R. Waterman, Joe C. Bar-
rett, Carl W. Funk, Robert Haydock, Jr., Ray D. Henson, William Curtis Pierce, Harold
Marsh, Jr., Millard H. Ruud, and Herbert Wechsler. Robert Braucher acted as Reporter,
while Homer Kripke and Soia Mentschikoff served as Associate Reporters. Grant Gil-
more and Peter Coogan were Consultants to the Committee. Funk, The Proposed Revi-
sion of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 Bus. L.4w. 1465, 1466-67 & n.7
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Funk].
11. In fact, dissatisfaction with section 9-313 on the part of critics and legislatures
was perhaps the primary reason for appointment of the committee to review Article 9.
Coogan, supra note 1 at 484.
12. First Report of the Review Committee for Article 9: Preliminary Draft No. 1,
24 Bus. Aw. 341 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Draft No. 1].
13. See, e.g., Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 75 HAv. L. R1v. 1319 (1962); Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 44 (1964); Shanker, A Further Critique of the Fix-
ture Section of Uniform Commercial Code, 6 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rav. 61 (1964-65);
Shanker, An Integrated Financing System for Purchase Money Collateral: A Proposed
Solution to the Fixture Problem Under Section 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
73 YALE LJ. 788 (1964).
14. Preliminary Report No. 2 of the Review Committee on Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 25 Bus. LAw. 1067 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary
Draft No. 2].
15. Revised section 9-313 provides:
"(1) In this section and in the provisions of Part 4 of this Article referring to
fixture filing, unless the context otherwise requires
(a) goods are 'fixtures' when they become so related to particular real estate that
an interest in them arises under real estate law
(b) a 'fixture filing' is the filing in the office where a mortgage on the real estate
would be filed or recorded of a financing statement covering goods which are or
are to become fixtures and conforming to the requirements of subsection (5) of Sec-
tion 9-402
(c) a mortgage is a 'construction mortgage' to the extent that it secures an obliga-
tion incurred for the construction of an improvement on land including the acquisi-
tion cost of the land, if the recorded writing so indicates.
One of the major changes made in section 9-313 concerns the
"(2) A security interest under this Article may be created in goods which are fix-
tures or may continue in goods which become fixtures, but no security interest exists
under this Article in ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement on
land.
"(3) This Article does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures pur-
suant to real estate law.
"(4) A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the conflicting in-
terest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where
(a) the security interest is a purchase money security interest, the interest of the
encumbrancer or owner arises before the goods become fixtures, the security interest
is perfected by a fixture filing before the goods become fixtures or within ten days
thereafter, and the debtor has an interest of record in the real estate or is in pos-
session of the real estate; or
(b) the security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the interest of the
encumbrancer or owner is of record, the security interest has priority over any con-
flicting interest of a predecessor in title of the encumbrancer or owner, and the
debtor has an interest of record in the real estate or is in possession of the real
estate; or
(c) the fixtures are readily removable factory or office machines or readily re-
movable replacements of domestic appliances which are consumer goods, and before
the goods become fixtures the security interest is perfected by any method permitted
by this Article; or
(d) the conflicting interest is a lien on the real estate obtained by legal or equit-
able proceedings after the security interest was perfected by any method permitted
by this Article.
"(5) A security interest in fixtures, whether or not perfected, has priority over
the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where
(a) the encumbrancer or owner has consented in writing to the security interest
or has disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures; or
(b) the debtor has a right to remove the goods as against the encumbrancer or
owner. If the debtor's right terminates, the priority of the security interest contin-
ues for a reasonable time.
"(6) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of subsection (4) but otherwise subject to
subsections (4) and (5), a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a construction
mortgage recorded before the goods become fixtures if the goods become fixtures before
the completion of the construction. To the extent that it is given to refinance a con-
struction mortgage, a mortgage has this priority to the same extent as the construction
mortgage.
"(7) In cases not within the preceeding subsections, a security interest in fixtures
is subordinate to the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the related
real estate who is not the debtor.
"(8) When the secured party has priority over all owners and encumbrancers of
the real estate, he may, on default, subject to the provisions of Part 5, remove his col-
lateral from the real estate but he must reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of the
real estate who is not the debtor and who has not otherwise agreed for the cost of repair
of any physical injury, but not for any diminution in value of the real estate caused by
the absence of the goods removed or by any necessity of replacing them. A person en-
titled lo reimbursement may refuse permission to remove until the secured party gives
adequate security for the performance of this obligation." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 9-313. Significant changes were also made in sections 9-302(l)(d), 9-401(l)-(5),
9-402, 9-403 (6)-(7), & 9-405(2).
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priority given to construction financiers.16 The 1962 provision favored
an unfiled purchase money security interest in fixtures over a prior
mortgage of real estate. 17 The Review Committee adopted the Cali-
fornia position, according priority to the prior mortgagee of real prop-
erty who is a construction financier over even a purchase money se-
cured party who makes a fixture filing.' 8 This change was adopted in
the hope "that the states like California and Ohio, which did not adopt
section 9-313 at all or modified it out of recognition might come back
into the fold and yet leave other states with a program that we can live
with."' 9 Nevertheless, the revised section 9-313, even though substan-
tially identical to pre-code California law,2 ° was totally rejected in this
state.2 '
The sagacity of this decision is questionable. This will be demon-
strated by an examination of the California law of fixtures22 and an
explanation of how the Uniform Commercial Code would have changed
existing law. The wisdom of the California decision to reject the fixture
provisions of the revised Uniform Commercial Code will be assessed by
weighing the problems inherent in section 9-313 itself against the bene-
ficial effect a change in priorities would have on California law.23 A new
term of art to replace "fixture" will be presented 24 and the benefits of a
fresh start under the Uniform Commercial Code discussed.25
Present California Law
Division 9 of the California Commercial Code, which is substan-
tially Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, governs the rights and
priorities between a person with a security interest in fixtures and
anyone other than a real property claimant.2 6 Although the California
code does not define "fixture" it does delineate the outer limits of the
word: goods which are incorporated into a structure "in the manner of
lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metalwork and the like" will not be
16. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 313.
17. UNIORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(2) (1962).
18. Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(6) with Dauch v. Ginsburg,
214 Cal. 540, 6 P.2d 952 (1931).
19. Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 316.
20. See text accompanying notes 69-106 infra.
21. A.B. 2510 (1973-74) deleted revised section 9-313 from the proposed amend-
ments to Division 9. Most of the 1972 Uniform Commercial Code amendments to Arti-
cle 9 were adopted by the California legislature and will become effective January 1,
1976. Cal. Stat. 1974, ch. 997.
22. See text accompanying notes 26-68 infra.
23. See text accompanying notes 107-73 infra.
24. See text accompanying notes 180-81 infra.
25. See text accompanying notes 174-81 infra.
26. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9102(1)(c) (West Supp. 1975).
governed by division 9 unless the structure itself remains personal
property under applicable law. 21 The rights and priorities of parties
having an interest in fixtures themselves are the same as the rights and
priorities of individuals claiming interests in goods which are not fix-
tures.28 Problems arise only where there are conflicts between chattel
secured parties with an interest in fixtures and third parties having or
acquiring an interest in or a lien on real estate. They must look outside
the code for a definition of the word "fixture" and resolution of their
conflict.
A survey of the cases indicates that the law of fixtures in California
is in a state of chaos. 29 The problem stems from the dual meaning
assigned by the courts to the word "fixture." Literally speaking, any
object that is physically attached to land may be labeled a fixture. 30 This
factual description, however, does not necessarily lead to a conclusion
that the item in question is a fixture in the legal sense.3 ' Unfortunately,
courts have not seen this distinction and have used the word "fixture"
not only to denote the physical object itself and physical affixation to
land but also to justify a particular legal result. In other words, the
determination that an object is a fixture inevitably defines the legal
relations between parties to a dispute over the physical object.12 Appel-
late courts have confused findings of fact with conclusions of law and
affirmed trial court decisions on this basis.33
The failure to distinguish between a legal conclusion and the
factual determination that an object is a fixture is compounded by a
judicial effort to employ an all-inclusive fixtures test.34 This approach
27. Id. § 9105(1)(f) (West 1964). This limitation on the scope of "goods" cov-
ered by the code was adopted in California for clarification. Id. § 9105, California
Code Comment 5 (West 1964).
28. See id. § 9102(1)(c) (West Supp. 1975).
29. See, e.g., Broadway Improvement & Inv. Co. v. Tumansky, 2 Cal. 2d 465, 41
P.2d 553 (1935); Pacific Mortgage Guar. Co. v. Rosoff, 20 Cal. App. 2d 383, 67 P.2d
110 (1937); Fisher v. Pennington, 116 Cal. App. 248, 2 P.2d 518 (1931); Southern Cal.
Hardwood & Mfg. Co. v. Borton, 46 Cal. App. 524, 189 P. 1022 (1920). See generally
Horowitz, The Law of Fixtures in California-A Critical Analysis, 26 S. CAL. L. REV.
21 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Horowitz].
30. See Horowitz, supra note 29, at 21. "A thing is deemed to be affixed to land
when it is attached to it by roots, as in the case of trees, vines, or shrubs; or imbedded
in it, as in the case of walls; or permanently resting upon it, as in the case of buildings;
or permanently attached to what is thus permanent, as by means of cement, plaster,
nails, bolts, or screws .... ." CAL. CIV. CODE § 660 (West 1954).
31. Horowitz, supra note 29, at 22.
32. Id. at 22-23; see, e.g., Broadway Improvement & Inv. Co. v. Tumansky, 2 Cal.
2d 465, 41 P.2d 553 (1935); Pacific Mortgage Guar. Co. v. Rosoff, 20 Cal. App. 2d
383, 67 P.2d 110 (1937); Fisher v. Penmington, 116 Cal. App. 248, 2 P.2d 518 (1931);
Southern Cal. Hardwood & Mfg. Co. v. Borton, 46 Cal. App. 524, 189 P. 1022 (1920).
33. Horowitz, supra note 29, at 23.
34. Id. at 22.
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has been applied to any legal problem concerning an object which is
physically attached to the land even though the actual issue involved
might be tort liability,3 5 the proper construction of a conveyance,36 or
the rights and priorities of creditors.3 7 Reliance on one comprehensive
fixtures test obscures the considerations which should lie behind the
solution of each kind of problem. Professor Horowitz explains:
There is no separate universe of the law in which objects are either
fixtures or not, nor is there any omnipotent force which makes
metaphysical changes in physical objects, changing them from "per-
sonalty" into "fixtures." . . . The use of a mechanical fixtures
test for all problems, or the statement of all issues in terms of
whether or not a particular object has. become a fixture or realty,
whatever may be the nature of the underlying policy problem,
should be recognized to lead to obscuring of the pertinent policy
factors which should be considered in a particular case .... 38
The contradictions inherent in the use of a mechanical fixtures test
become apparent if one selects any object likely to be attached to real
estate and traces its treatment by the courts. For example, Murphy beds
have been held to be personalty in some cases and realty in others. In
Southern California Hardwood & Manufacturing Co. v. Borton,39 a
conditional seller of wall beds was favored over the purchasing land-
lord's assignee for the benefit of creditors. The real issue in the case was
whether an assignee for the benefit of creditors should have been treated
as a bona fide purchaser.40 The court, however, focused on the question
of whether the beds were personalty or realty and held that they were
personalty. 41 On the other hand, in Pacific Mortgage Guaranty Co. v.
Rosoff,42 the court held that Murphy beds were fixtures and hence
realty. 43 The Rosoff court's attempt to distinguish Borton as a case
where there was no intention to attach the beds permanently to the
building" is untenable. The court should have avoided metaphysics and
distinguished Borton as a case involving completely different policy
considerations, since in Rosoff the real issue was whether a construction
financier who was the prior mortgagee of the building where the wall
beds were installed should have been given priority over the subsequent
conditional seller of the beds.
35. See Fisher v. Pennington, 116 Cal. App. 248, 2 P.2d 518 (1931).
36. See Broadway Improvement & Inv. Co. v. Tumansky, 2 Cal. 2d 465, 41 P.2d
553 (1935).
37. See Southern Cal. Hardwood & Mfg. Co. v. Borton, 46 Cal. App. 524, 189
P. 1022 (1920).
38. Horowitz, supra note 29, at 22.
39. 46 Cal. App. 524, 189 P. 1022 (1920).
40. See id. at 528, 189 P. at 1024.
41. See id. at 530-31, 189 P. at 1025 (opinion by Sup. Ct. denying rehearing).
42. 20 Cal. App. 2d 383, 67 P.2d 110 (1937).
43. Id. at 385-86, 67 P.2d at 1I.
44. Id. at 385, 67 P.2d at 111.
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In the area of priorities, the California case law applying this
mechanical fixtures test can be divided into two categories: where the
conflict is between the bona fide purchaser of real estate and the chattel
mortgagee, and where the conflict is between the landlord or his assign-
ee and the chattel mortgagee.
Bona Fide Purchaser and Prior Mortgagee
The law of fixtures in California developed from the three-prong
test of Teaff v. Hewitt,4 5 which defined a fixture on the basis of: (1)
physical annexation to land; (2) adaptability to use with the land; and
(3) intention of the annexor to make a permanent improvement on the
land. The issue in Teaff was whether a machine was a fixture and
therefore included in a real estate mortgage although not specifically
mentioned therein. The test enunciated effectively aids a court in con-
struing a conveyance of land where nothing is said in the conveyance
about a particular chattel owned by the landowner.46
In a case where the chattel is purchased under a conditional sales
agreement prior to the sale or mortgaging of land, and subsequent
thereto the debtor defaults, the courts resolve any conflict between the
conditional seller and the landowner or mortgagee in favor of the party
having an interest in realty as long as he is a bona fide purchaser
without notice of the conditional seller's claim.47 The decisions apply
Teaffs three-prong test in conjunction with Civil Code sections 658-60,
which provide a definition of real property,48 to determine the maximum
scope of the bona fide purchaser's interest.49
Nevertheless, in their haste to give priority to the bona fide pur-
chaser, courts have ignored the third prong of the Teaff v. Hewitt test-
a determination of the annexor's intent to make a permanent improve-
ment on the land."0 Instead, they have improperly focused on the intent
45. 1 Ohio St. 511, 59 Am. Dec. 634 (1853).
46. Horowitz, supra note 29, at 25.
47. The leading case is Oakland Bank of Sav. v. California Pressed Brick Co., 183
Cal. 295, 191 P. 524 (1920); accord, M. P. Moller, Inc. v. Wilson, 8 Cal. 2d 31, 63
P.2d 818 (1936); Western Machinery Co. v. Graetz, 42 Cal. App. 2d 296, 108 P.2d 711
(1940); Etienne v. Millbrae Golf and Country Club, 27 Cal. App. 2d 452, 81 P.2d 245
(1938); Frick v. Frigidaire Corp., 119 Cal. App. 707, 7 P.2d 321 (1932); Peninsula
Burner & Oil Co. v. McCaw, 116 Cal. App. 569, 3 P.2d 40 (1931); Bell v. Mortgage
Guar. Co., 109 Cal. App. 203, 292 P. 660 (1930).
48. "Real or immovable property consists of: 1) [l]and; 2) [tlhat which is af-
fixed to land; 3) [t]hat which is coincidental or appurtenant to land; 4) [t]hat which
is immovable by law .... ." CAL. CIV. CODE § 658 (West 1954). "Land is the ma-
terial of the earth, whatever may be the ingredients of which it is composed, whether
soil, rock, or other substance .... ." CAL. CIv. CODE § 659 (West 1954). The text
of Civil Code section 660 is found at note 30 supra.
49. Horowitz, supra note 29, at 47.
50. See, e.g., Dauch v. Ginsburg, 214 Cal. 540, 544-45, 6 P.2d 952, 953-54
[Vol. 27
September 19751 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION 9-313 243
of the chattel vendor. Moreover, they have failed to consider even the
vendor's actual desire to retain some control over the chattel, but have
relied on a fiction that the conditional seller intended to bring about a
transformation of personalty to realty.5 In Oakland Bank of Savings v.
California Pressed Brick Co.,52 for example, the conditional vendor of a
boiler was held to have agreed that it had become real property since he
voluntarily transferred it to his vendee with knowledge that it would
necessarily be affixed to land if it were to be used. 53 This decision is a
natural result when the courts resort to an analysis which rests upon the
intended transformation of personalty into realty. Most likely, the condi-
tional seller in Oakland Bank intended that his vendee be prevented
from conveying the boiler to a bona fide purchaser.
Courts are equally unpersuasive when they speak in terms of the
conditional vendor's misrepresentation. The cases hold that the condi-
tional chattel vendor, by giving his vendee possession and control over a
chattel, misleads and deceives the subsequent bona fide purchaser of
land.54
In Oakland Bank, the court indicated that the conditional seller
could have protected himself against the claims of the subsequent bona
fide purchaser of realty by recording his sales contract in the real estate
records. 55 Anyone who buys land has actual or constructive knowledge
of all matters recorded and within the chain of title. 6 If a chattel which
would normally be included in a conveyance is affixed to the real estate,
any outstanding interests in the chattel should be available to the bona
fide purchaser in the records, even though the recording statutes do not
specifically so provide.57 This analysis, rather than fictions about trans-
(1931); Oakland Bank of Say. v. California Pressed Brick Co., 183 Cal. 295, 302-03,
191 P. 524, 527 (1920); Hammel Radiator Corp. v. Mortgage Guar. Co., 129 Cal. App.
468, 471, 18 P.2d 993, 994-95 (1933); Peninsula Burner & Oil Co. v. McCaw, 116 Cal.
App. 569, 571, 3 P.2d 40, 41 (1931); Bell v. Mortgage Guar. Co., 109 Cal. App. 203,
205, 292 P. 660, 661 (1930).
51. See, e.g., Peninsula Burner & Oil Co. v. McCaw, 116 Cal. App. 569, 571, 3
P.2d 40, 41 (1931); Bell v. Mortgage Guar. Co., 109 Cal. App. 203, 205, 292 P. 660,
661 (1930).
52. 183 Cal. 295, 191 P. 524 (1920).
53. Id. at 302-03, 191 P. at 527.
54. "A person about to loan money on the security of a mortgage or trust deed
on such real property, and having no information of the secret agreement as to the title,
would be justified in believing that all the machinery would be hypothecated by such
mortgage or deed and would have the right to rely on such belief and to make the loan
accordingly. He is the innocent party in the transaction and he should be protected
rather than the party who caused the deceitful appearances." Id. at 303, 191 P. at 527;
accord, Peninsula Burner & Oil Co. v. McCaw, 116 Cal. App. 569, 571, 3 P.2d 40, 41
(1931).
55. 183 Cal. 295, 303, 191 P. 524, 527 (1920).
56. CAL. CrV. CoDE § 1213 (West 1954).
57. Horowitz, supra note 29, at 49.
forming personalty into realty and misleading real estate interests, pro-
vides a coherent basis for favoring the subsequent bona fide purchaser
of land over the conditional seller of goods. The drafters of the Uniform
Commercial Code followed this line of reasoning and provided that the
bona fide purchaser would be accorded priority unless the conditional
chattel vendor recorded his interest.58
Related to the bona fide purchaser question is the problem of the
prior mortgagee. In California the prior mortgagee of real estate is
favored over a conditional vendor of goods if removal of the goods will
substantially injure or diminish the security of the prior encumbrancer.59
This impairment of security test is potentially all-encompassing since
removal of any fixtures sufficiently valuable to justify the taking of a
security interest, such as heating and refrigeration equipment, will inevi-
tably reduce the value of the mortgagee's security.
58. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(4)(b).
59. Dauch v. Ginsburg, 214 Cal. 540, 6 P.2d 952 (1931). Dauch should have
been limited to the construction financier's special circumstances. The mortgagee in
Dauch lent money for the construction of a hotel. In consideration for his advances
he received a security interest in the hotel. He prevailed over a conditional seller of
heating and plumbing fixtures. Since, as the court held, these fixtures were indispensible
for the use and operation of the hotel, and since removal of the fixtures would render
worthless the main security for the loan, the construction financier prevailed over the
subsequent conditional vendor.
The court, however, did not limit its holding to the foregoing. It insisted that
"there is a well-recognized exception" to the rule that a conditional vendor prevails over
a prior encumbrancer "where a severance of the fixtures will substantially injure or di-
minish the security of the prior encumbrancer." Id. at 545, 6 P.2d at 954 (emphasis
added). The court cited Corpus Juris for this proposition. Id. However, Corpus Juris
provides only that "[t]he right of a chattel mortgagee or conditional vendor to claim
the article annexed as against the prior mortgagee of the realty has been said to exist
only in so far as its removal will not cause substantial injury to the realty .... ." 26
C.J. Fixtures § 52 (1921) (emphasis added). The cases cited include Detroit Steel
Cooperage Co. v. Sistersville Brewing Co., 233 U.S. 712 (1914) and Holt v. Henley,
232 U.S. 637 (1914). In the Detroit Steel case the court held that tanks, essential to
the working of a brewery, which had been installed in a recess that was subsequently
bricked-up could be removed with "trifling" injury to the realty. 233 U.S. at 718. In
Holt a 50,000 gallon tank on a steel tower, bolted to a concrete foundation with pipes
connecting the tank to the mill was also held removable. Severance of the sprinkler
system did not affect the integrity of the structure on which the mortgagees made ad-
vances. To hold otherwise would have given "a mystic importance to attachment by
bolts and screws" according to the court. 232 U.S. at 641. In both cases the condi-
tional vendor was favored over the prior mortgagee. Clearly the California court had
no authority for creating an "impairment of security" test out of the "substantial injury
to realty" test articulated by the United States Supreme Court. This impairment of se-
curity test is not limited to the construction financier situation. It is applicable when-
ever there is a conflict between a conditional vendor and a prior mortgagee. See Broad-
way Improvement & Inv. Co. v. Tumansky, 2 Cal. 2d 465, 41 P.2d 553 (1935); cf.
Southern Cal. Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of Equal., 12 Cal. 2d 127, 136, 82 P.2d 422, 427
(1938).
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Landlord and Tenant
Another question faced by the California courts is whether an
owner of land becomes the owner of a chattel affixed to his land by
another in the absence of any bargain or agreement between the parties
as to ownership. The problem is compounded where a third party claims
a security interest in the chattel.
Under Civil Code section 1019 a tenant may remove anything
affixed to the land "for purposes of trade, manufacture, ornament, or
domestic use' until the end of his term.6" The tenant will be liable to his
landlord for any injury to the real estate he may cause in removing the
chattel. 6 Furthermore, removal will not be permitted if the tenant is
unable to restore the premises to the condition they were in when he
rented them.62 The landlord may also contract with his tenant that
goods not become fixtures but remain personalty, 65 which will allow the
latter to remove the goods within a reasonable time after the expiration
of his term. If the tenant can remove the goods as against the landlord,
then a secured party should also have priority over the landlord.
Normally the buyer of goods signs an agreement that title will
remain in -the seller until the goods are fully paid for. If the buyer
defaults, the seller should be able to repossess the goods. The lessor of
realty will not prevail against the conditional vendor, regardless of any
agreement between lessor and lessee that purports to dispose of the
goods. 4 The courts say that the lessor will stand in his lessee's shoes.6 5
The landlord is not, however, a bona fide purchaser. A bona fide
purchaser from a landlord who takes without notice of a tenant's interest
in goods will have priority over the claims of the tenant even in situa-
60. CAL Civ. CODE § 1019 (West 1954).
61. Goldberg v. Stanton, 84 Cal. App. 665, 258 P. 417 (1927).
62. Horowitz, supra note 29, at 44.
63. See, e.g., Weisberg v. Loughridge, 253 Cal. App. 2d 416, 61 Cal. Rptr. 563
(1967); Clark v. Talmadge, 23 Cal. App. 2d 703, 74 P.2d 825 (1937); Cone v. Western
Trust & Say. Bank, 21 Cal. App. 2d 176, 68 P.2d 981 (1937).
64. In one case for example, the lease provided that any personal property belong-
ing to the lessee would be deemed abandoned, at the option of the lessor, if the lessee
vacated, surrendered, or abandoned the premises. The lessee subsequently abandoned
his cleaning establishment, leaving equipment affixed to the leased premises which had
been purchased under a conditional sales agreement. When the conditional vendor had
the equipment removed because his vendee defaulted on his contract to purchase the ma-
chinery, the lessor asserted his claim to the equipment under the terms of the lease. The
court held that the conditional vendor's interest was superior to that of the lessor. EAC
Credit Corp. v. Bass, 21 Cal. App. 3d 645, 98 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1971); accord, Garnette
v. Mankel, 71 Cal. App. 2d 783, 163 P.2d 466 (1945).
65. E.g., Hendy v. Dinkerhoff, 57 Cal. 3, 7 (1880); EAC Credit Corp. v. Bass,
21 Cal. App. 3d 645, 654, 98 Cal. Rptr. 681, 686 (1971); Garnette v. Mankel, 71 Cal.
App. 2d 783, 786, 163 P.2d 466, 468 (1945); see Byron Jackson Iron Works v. Hoge,
49 Cal. App. 700, 705, 194 P. 45, 47 (1920).
tions where, as between landlord and tenant, the latter owns the
goods.6" Conversely, if the subsequent purchaser has actual or con-
structive notice of the tenant's interest in a chattel, the tenant will pre-
vail over the subsequent purchaser of land.67 It follows that a subse-
quent purchaser of real property who has actual or constructive notice
of a conditional sales agreement between his grantor's tenant and a
chattel vendor will not be favored over the chattel vendor. 68
Effect of Adoption of Uniform Commercial Code
Fixtures Provisions
Revised section 9-313 defers to state real estate law for a definition
of the word "fixture": "[G]oods are 'fixtures' when they become so
related to particular real estate that an interest in them arises under real
estate law."69 This definition would be all-inclusive but for the statement
that "no security interest exists under this Article in ordinary building
materials incorporated into an improvement on land."7" The governing
real estate law is "that applicable in a three-party situation, determining
whether chattel financing can survive as against parties who acquire
rights through the affixation of the goods to the real estate."'" Conse-
quently, had California adopted revised section 9-313, its definition of
fixtures would have been retained. 2
Fixture Filing
Once an object is classified as a fixture by state law, the Uniform
Commercial Code takes over and resolves conflicting interests in the
object. 7'3 Under existing California law, by contrast, a determination that
an object is a fixture is also a determination of priorities. 74 Adoption of
66. Camp v. Matich, 87 Cal. App. 2d 660, 197 P.2d 345 (1948).
67. Where goods are affixed in such a manner that they are readily removable,
a purchaser of realty may be put on notice that the tenant retains an interest in them.
See Jahnke v. Jahnke, 81 Cal. App. 387, 253 P. 752 (1927). A subsequent purchaser
of land waives any rights he might otherwise have in a chattel by acknowledging the
ownership of another. Estus v. Weber, 76 Cal. App. 2d 724, 173 P.2d 870 (1946).
68. Nead v. Specimen Hill Mining Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d 475, 482, 126 P.2d 450,
454 (1942).
69. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(1)(a).
70. Id. § 9-313(2).
71. Id. § 9-313, Comment2.
72. See text accompanying notes 26-68 supra.
73. H. MARSH & W. WARREN, REPORT ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE, SENATE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, SIXTH PRO-
GRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, PART 1-THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, I AP-
PENDIX TO JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 436, 578 (1961).
74. See, e.g., Broadway Improvement & Inv. Co. v. Tumansky, 2 Cal. 2d 465, 41
P.2d 553 (1935); Pacific Mortgage Guar. Co. v. Rosoff, 20 Cal. App. 2d 383, 67 P.2d
110 (1937); Fisher v. Pennington, 116 Cal. App. 248, 2 P.2d 518 (1931); Southern Cal.
Hardwood & Mfg. Co. v. Borton, 46 Cal. App. 524, 189 P. 1022 (1920).
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section 9-313 would therefore modify California law. However, it would
not effect a radical change. Under most circumstances, the Uniform
Commercial Code would permit the conditional seller to prevail only if
he made a fixture filing in the office where a mortgage on the real estate
would be filed or recorded. 75 In California this would be in the county
where the land is located. 76
Under present California law, when a secured party relies on a
security interest in fixtures, he should have it acknowledged, recorded in
the county where the real estate is located, and indexed as an interest in
real property.7 On these points, therefore, the California law does not
differ substantially from the Uniform Commercial Code.
Despite these similarities, there has been considerable criticism of
fixture filing in California as an effective means of providing notice to
holders of interests in realty. 78 Such criticism is unwarranted. The
Uniform Commercial Code requires that the financing statement 79 in-
clude the secured party's name as well as the debtor's name and signa-
ture."° If the debtor does not have an interest of record in the real estate,
75. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(1) (b). Revised section 9-313 affords
protection against realty interests without filing where the real estate encumbrancer or
owner has consented to the security interest or where the debtor has the right to remove
the fixture without the consent of the owner or encumbrancer. Id. § 9-313(5). A fix-
ture security interest is protected against the claims of those who obtain a lien on the
land by legal or equitable proceedings subsequent to perfection of the security interest
by any method permitted by Article 9. Id. § 9-313(4) (d). Any method of perfection
will also protect chattel interests in readily removable factory or office machines and
replacements of domestic appliances which are consumer goods. Id. § 9-313(4)(c).
Only in the case of purchase money security interests in consumer goods may perfection
be accomplished without filing. Id. § 9-302(1) (d).
76. 3 CALIFORNIA COMMERCIAL LAW § 5.69 (I. Rosenblatt ed. 1966).
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Letter from Robert D. Crawford (Chairman, California Land Title
Association) to Sean E. McCarthy (Assistant Legislative Counsel, Caiifornia Land Title
Association), March 18, 1974.
79. A security agreement is "an agreement which creates or provides for a security
interest." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-105(1) (1). UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
section 9-203(1) contains the formal requisites of security agreement. While a security
agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, perfection is necessary
to achieve priority over third parties. Id. H8 9-201, 9-301. A financing statment must
be filed to perfect most security interests. Id. § 9-302. The purpose of a financing
statement, the formal requisites of which are found in Uniform Commercial Code sec-
tion 9-402, is "to give notice to the world that designated parties have entered into a
secured transaction covering described collateral." R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE 39 (1973).
80. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402(1). The revised code permits a mort-
gage to be effective as a fixture financing statement. Since real estate mortgages are
normally signed by the mortgagor and not the mortgagee, a requirement that both the
secured party and the debtor sign a fixture financing statement would render mortgages
used for fixture filings ineffective. Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 311; UNIFoRm
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402, Reasons for 1972 Change. A financing statement suffici-
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the record owner's name must be added to the financing statement,"'
which will then be indexed under the names of both the record owner
and the debtor.8 2 Since revised subsections 9-313(4)(a) and (b) permit
fixture filing against debtors in possession of land who do not have
interests of record, this procedure is necessary so that the financing
statement will be found in a search of the real estate records.8 3 The
financing statement would also be indexed under the name of the
secured party in states like California where mortgages of land are
indexed under the name of the mortgagee.84 If the secured party assigns
his interest, the assignment must be indexed under the name of the
secured party.8 5 In California it would be indexed under the assignee's
name as well.86 This procedure would make it a virtual certainty that a
financing statement would be found by a search of the records.
The financing statement must describe the fixture and the real
estate upon which it is affixed.8 7 Under the Uniform Commercial Code
a description of the real estate is adequate if it reasonably identifies what
is described; 88 a street address, for example, would suffice.89  A duly
recorded mortgage which complies with the above mentioned require-
ments is also effective as a financing statement." The drafters provided
optional language which, if adopted, would require a description "suffi-
cient if it were contained in a mortgage of the real estate to give
constructive notice of the mortgage under the law of this state." 91 This
optional language could be interpreted as necessitating a full-blown
legal description, but such an interpretation would contravene the draf-
ters' intent to provide inexpensive, expeditious fixture filing.9"
ently shows the name of the debtor if it gives his individual, partnership, or corproate
name, whether or not other trade names or the names of partners are added. UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402(7).
81. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402(5).
82. Id. § 9-403(7).
83. Id. § 9-402, Reasons for 1972 Change.
84. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27235 (West 1968) with UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 9-403 (7).
85. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-405(2).
86. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27244 (West 1968) with UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 9-405(2).
87. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402(5).
88. Id. §§ 9-110 & 9-402, Comment 5.
89. Compare id. § 9-402, Reasons for 1972 Change with id. § 9-402, Comment
5.
90. Id. § 9-402(6). In general, chattel filings expire after five years. Id. § 9-
403(2). A real estate mortgage, however, remains effective as a fixture filing until the
mortgage is released or satisfied of record or its effectiveness is otherwise terminated.
Id. § 9-403(6).
91. Id. § 9-402(5).
92. Ayer, The New Article 9 and the California Commercial Code, 21 U.C.LA.L.
REv. 937, 952 (1974); Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 315.
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Under existing California law a legal description of the real proper-
ty is necessary for a security interest in fixtures to be perfected.93
Furthermore, the secured party should obtain from his debtor, existing
mortgagees (or beneficiaries under trust deeds), the owner, and any
sublessee of the premises where the goods are located, explicit waivers
that the goods be classified as fixtures.94 Such waivers will provide
potential bona fide purchasers, subsequent mortgagees, and assignees
with notice that the goods shall continue to be characterized as personal
property rather than as fixtures.95 The California procedure is aimed at
93. 3 CALIFOuNI COMMERCIAL LAw, § 9.46 (I. Rosenblatt ed. 1966).
94. Id.
95. Id. The following sample of a waiver agreement for real property interests
demonstrates the complexity and expense necessary for a secured party to perfect his
interest in fixtures in California:
"MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT AND NOTICE OF WAIVERS
AFFECTING INTERESTS IN REAL PROPERTY
"Notice is given that the following furniture, equipment, and other personal prop-
erty, (items described), some of which may be affixed in an apparently permanent man-
ner to the premises located at (name of county), California, these premises being more.
particularly described as (legal description), are the subject of a security agreement, not
fully set forth here, with (secured party), on (date), in which (I/we), having an interest
in the premises, have given a security interest in the personal property described above
and have agreed, and here affirm, that all of the personal property, no matter how af-
fixed or secured to or where located on the premises, is not to be considered fixtures.
"This agreement and this affirmation of it shall be binding on (my/our) successors




(Typed name of debtor)
(Acknowledgment)
"Each of the undersigned, (beneficiaries of trust deeds, mortgagees, owners, land-
lords, and sublessors), of the premises described above, by separate agreement(s), not
fully set forth here, has waived any and all rights or interest in or to the personal prop-
erty and has agreed, and here affirms, that all of the personal property described above,
no matter how affixed or secured to or where located on the premises is not to be con-
sidered fixtures.
'This waiver and agreement and this affirmation of them shall be binding on the
successors and assigns of each of the undersigned and shall inure to the benefit of (se-
cured party), his successors and assigns only.
(Date)
(Signature of beneficiary of
trust deed or mortgagee)
(Typed name of beneficiary of




(Typed name of landlord)
(Acknowledgment)
(Date)
avoiding the legal conclusion that an object is a fixture. The Uniform
Commercial Code, on the other hand, attempts to give those with an
interest in personalty protection once an object has been declared a
fixture.
Benefits From Adoption of Section 9-313
When Article 9 was initially introduced in California, the Califor-
nia Bankers Association,96 Professors Marsh and Warren, 97 and the
California State Bar Subcommittee on Article 998 all recommended
strongly against adoption of the original section 9-313 because it would
"add further confusion to the already confused California law of fix-
tures."99 The revised section 9-313 has been similarly criticized. The
fact remains, however, that the confusion lies in state definitions, not in
Uniform Commercial Code priorities. While California should develop
its own definition of fixtures for Article 9,00 adoption of the fixture
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code at this time will begin to
relieve the problem, not exacerbate it.
At the outset, it is important to note that in several significant
respects the Code and California law are exactly the same, and that
enactment of section 9-313 would not require a complete restructuring
of the California law. Both California and the Uniform Commercial
Code subordinate a security interest in fixtures to the interest of a
subsequent bona fide purchaser of the real property where the goods are
affixed. The secured party is preferred over the subsequent purchaser,
however, when the secured party provides the purchaser with construe-
(Signature of sublessor)
(Typed name of sublessor)
(Acknowledgment)"
Id. at § 9.47. Note that a financing statement covering fixtures would also have to be
filed as any other personal property security interest, either locally or centrally depend-
ing on the classification under California Commercial Code section 9401. Id. at § 5.69.
96. RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS OF THE CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASSocIA-
TION, CALIFORNIA SENATE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, SIXTH PROGRESS RE-
PORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, PART I-THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, I APPENDIX TO
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 402, 417 (1961).
97. H. MARSH & W. WARREN, REPORT ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE, SENATE FACT FINDING COMMrITEE ON JUDICIARY, SIXTH PRO-
GRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, PART 1-THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, I AP-
PENDIX TO JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 436, 578 (1961).
98. STATE BAR COMMITTEE ON THE COMMERCIAL CODE, ANALYSIS AND INTERIM
REPORT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, FINAL REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, SENATE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON
JUDICIARY, SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, PART 1-THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE, I APPENDIX TO JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 316, 400 (1961).
99. Id.
100. See text accompanying notes 174-81 infra.
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tive notice of his prior interest.'' Under the Uniform Commercial Code
this notice can be given by means of a fixture filing provided that the
debtor has either an interest of record or is in possession of the real
estate,102 and the secured party has priority over any interests of prede-
cessors in title of the conflicting owners and encumbrancers. 103
Both California and the Uniform Commercial Code agree that a
secured party who has priority over owners and encumbrancers of land
must pay for any physical injury to the real estate by reason of the
removal of the goods."0 The secured party is not responsible to owners
and encumbrancers, however, for any diminution in value of the realty
caused by the absence of the goods or the necessity of replacing them.105
Under the Code an owner or encumbrancer entitled to damages may
require an adequate assurance of payment before he allows the secured
party to remove the fixtures. On the other hand, the secured party is
not required to reimburse his debtor for any harm caused to the real
property by removal of the fixtures.106
Change in Priorities
Prior Mortgages
The Uniform Commercial Code provides that a purchase money
security interest in fixtures, perfected by a fixture filing, is to be favored
over prior conflicting interests of encumbrancers or owners of real estate
where the debtor possesses the land or has an interest of record.10 7 The
101. Compare Oakland Bank of Say. v. California Pressed Brick Co., 183 Cal. 295,
191 P. 524 (1920) with UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313 (4) (b) (1972).
102. Initially, the committee wanted to require that the debtor have an interest of
record in the real estate for a security interest in fixtures to have priority over com-
peting real estate interests. This would have meant that a secured party whose debtor
was a short-term lessee could not have perfected his security interest as against real es-
ate encumbrancers. Therefore, the committee decided to change the final draft of sec-
tion 9-313(4) (a) and (b) to extend protection to the secured party whose debtor is in
possession of land, though not a record owner. The secured party, in this case, would
be required to add a record owner's name to the financing statement and see that the
financing statement was indexed under the debtor's name and the name of the record
owner. Coogan, supra note 1, at 491 & n.50.
103. Since a person must be entitled to transfer what he has, a fixture security in-
terest, if subordinate to a mortgage, will also be subordinate to an interest of an assignee
of the mortgage even though the assignment is a later recorded instrument. The same
reasoning applies where a security interest is subordinate to that of an owner of land
who subsequently sells his property. Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 14 at 1074-75.
104. Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(8) with Goldberg v. Stanton,
84 Cal. App. 665, 258 P. 417 (1927).
105. See note 104 supra.
106. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(8).
107. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(4) (a). Non-purchase money security
interests in fixtures are rare. Coogan, supra note 1, at 494.
security interest must be perfected before the goods become fixtures or
within ten days thereafter. 10 8 In California a stricter rule prevails: the
prior mortgagee of real property retains the goods if removal would
substantially injure or diminish his security.' 09 The Uniform Commer-
cial Code is in accord with California however, when the prior mortga-
gee of land is a construction financier: a security interest in fixtures is
subordinate to a construction mortgage if it is recorded before the goods
become fixtures and if the goods become fixtures before the construction
is completed." 0
The effect of granting priority to the earlier real estate interest is to
restrict the availability of short-term credit for modernization of real
property through installation of new fixtures. 1' In the long run this
hurts real estate lenders-the class of creditors California is trying to
protect. Real estate improvements, whether through fixture or realty
additions, necessarily strengthen the debtor's ability to generate cash
108. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(4) (a). There will be a gap when a
party with a purchase money security interest in fixtures perfects after affixation but
before expiration of the ten day period. An intervening purchase or mortgage of the
realty will have priority over the fixture interest. Coogan, supra note 1, at 493-94.
109. Dauch v. Ginsburg, 214 Cal. 540, 6 P.2d 952 (1931); Hammel Radiator
Corp. v. Mortgage Guar. Co., 129 Cal. App. 468, 18 P.2d 993 (1933).
110. Compare Dauch v. Ginsburg, 214 Cal. 540, 6 P.2d 952 (1931) with UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(6). Professor Kripke comments: "When we provided
this construction mortgage priority, I expected to be denounced by the big manufacturers
of appliances who have their wholesale or commercial departments constantly endeavor-
ing to get Westinghouse or G.E. or Philco appliances in every new apartment. We
heard nothing from them and I took the trouble to make contacts to find out why. The
answer was that they never did expect to rely on a purchase money priority against con-
truction mortgagees because they knew that construction mortgagees intended to have
a first security interest in the whole building." Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 317.
Construction priority will not apply to additions made to the building after completion
of the improvement even if the additions are financed by the real estate mortgagee under
an open end clause of his construction mortgage. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-
313, Comment 4(e). The construction mortgagee's priority will not operate where he
has waived it under subsection 9-313 (5) (a), nor will it apply to subsection 9-313 (5) (b)
goods which the debtor could remove without consent of real estate interests. It also
will not defeat security interests in subsection 9-313(4)(c) replacements of factory or
office machines and readily removable replacements of domestic consumer appliances
which are perfected before or after recordation of the construction mortgage. The fix-
ure interests over which the construction mortgage takes priority will ordinarily be pur-
chase money security interests governed by subsection 9-313(4)(a). Coogan, supra
note 1, at 499. Thus, on its facts, Dauch v. Ginsburg is precisely covered by revised
section 9-313. Compare Dauch v. Ginsburg, 214 Cal. 540, 6 P.2d 952 (1931) with UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313.
111. Real estate lending is typically long-term and is generally carried on by insti-
tutional investors who can afford to take a long view of the matter rather than concen-
trate on any specific case. Purchase money fixture financing, in contrast, is typically
short-term and rarely produces any conflict with real estate lenders. UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 9-313, Comment 8.
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which will satisfy the mortgage commitment. If California were to adopt
revised section 9-313(4)(a), which favors the secured party over the
prior mortgagee, financing would perhaps be more readily available for
the modernization and improvement of real estate.
There is no reason to favor a prior mortgagee of realty who is not a
construction financier over the individual who has a purchase money
security interest in fixtures. The fixtures did not exist when the prior
mortgagee made advances, and he did not rely on their presence when
he lent money.112 The California impairment of security test may there-
fore lead to his unjust enrichment.
The California rule favoring a prior mortgagee of land over a
purchase money secured party is derived from Dauch v. Ginsburg,1 3
and should be limited to the situation involving a construction financier.
To be sure, the prior mortgagee who is a construction financier is
granted priority under the existing California law. This result was
embraced by the Article 9 Revision Committee. However, there does not
appear a compelling need to extend this protection to every prior
mortgagee.
The construction financier merits a preferred status vis-h-vis the
ordinary prior mortgagee because the security for a construction loan is
the edifice about to be built. The construction financier may reasonably
expect his collateral to be more than a shell; he takes a security interest
in the whole building, including all original installations of -fixtures. As a
purchase money financier, he stands on an equal footing with the holder
of a purchase money security interest in fixtures.11 4 Thus, in the absence
of a specific reason to favor the construction financier, his claims and
those of the purchase money secured party should be ranked according
to priority in time of filing or perfection; so long as conflicting security
interest are unperfected, the first to attach will have priority.1 5 Further-
more, the supplier of fixtures is not left without a remedy; he has
mechanic's lien rights like every other materialman so there is no reason
to give him an overlapping set of rights against the construction mortga-
gee.116
California should have adopted revised section 9-313(4)(a) which
provides an individual with a purchase money security interest in fix-
tures priority over a holder of a prior non-construction mortgage of land
as long as the fixture filing is indexed properly in the real estate
112. Horowitz, supra note 29, at 55.
113. 214 Cal. 540, 6 P.2d 952 (1931). See note 59 supra.
114. Kripke, The Review Committee's Proposals to Amend the Fixture Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 25 Bus. LAw. 301, 307 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Kripke].
115. Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312(5).
116. Preliminary Draft No. 1, supra note 12, at 347.
records.117 The provision permitting the secured party to file a financing
statement ten days after affixation" 8 could reasonably have been elimi-
nated to protect mortgages given to secure open-ended advances. The
mortgagee of land will search for perfected security interests in the real
estate records before making an advance. The advance would still be
vulnerable because of the ten day gap." 9 Elimination of this ten day
grace period would also insure a fixture secured party that he would
have priority over subsequent purchasers of land whenever the claims of
prior mortgagees were subordinated to his security interest. 2 '
Tenant's Fixtures
The Code is generally in accord with California law where land-
lord-tenant conflicts are in issue. 2 ' Normally, the goods installed by a
tenant will be classified as "trade fixtures."' 22 Since the debtor-tenant
has the right to remove trade fixtures as against his landlord, the Uni-
form Commercial Code would permit the secured party-whether or not
he perfects his interest-to prevail over the landlord.' 2 3 In California,
however, the tenant loses ownership of such fixtures if he does not
remove them before his tenancy terminates' unless the lease specifical-
ly provides otherwise.'2 5 It is therefore possible that a secured party's
right of removal after the tenancy has terminated will depend on wheth-
er the tenant's rights in the goods are governed by operation of law or by
an agreement with the landlord. There is no reason for a difference
depending upon whether the tenant has a removal agreement or not. 2 '
Revised section 9-313(5)(b) avoids the problem by granting the se-
cured party a reasonable time to remove in both cases. 27
Where no right of removal exists at all under state law, both
California and the Code favor a security interest in fixtures over the
117. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(4)(a).
118. Id.
119. Kratovil, Problems of Title Examiner Under Uniform Commercial Code-
Solutions Offered by Amendments, 5 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRusT J. 281, 285 (1970).
120. See note 108 supra.
121. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(5); see text accompanying notes
60-68 supra.
122. Funk, supra note 10, at 1476; see Horowitz, supra note 29, at 42-43.
123. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(5)(b).
124. See Rinaldi v. Goller, 48 Cal. 2d 276, 309 P.2d 451 (1957); Clark v. Tal-
madge, 23 Cal. App. 2d 703, 74 P.2d 825 (1937); Randolph Marketing Co. v. Stevenson,
65 Cal. App. 1,222 P. 849 (1923).
125. See Borchers Bros. Co. v. Ciaparro, 211 Cal. 507, 295 P. 1035 (1931); Weis-
berg v. Loughridge, 253 Cal. App. 2d 416, 61 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1967); Clark v. Talmadge,
23 Cal. App. 2d 703, 74 P.2d 825 (1937); Cone v. Western Trust & Sav. Bank, 21 Cal.
App. 2d 176, 68 P.2d 981 (1937); Earle v. Kelly, 21 Cal. App. 480, 132 P. 262 (1913).
126. Horowitz, supra note 29, at 44.
127. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(5)(b).
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conflicting interest of an owner or encumbrancer if the owner or encum-
brancer has consented in writing to the security interest or has dis-
claimed an interest in the goods as fixtures.1 28
Debtor's Bankruptcy
A secured party whose debtor becomes insolvent may find that
his security interest has been rendered worthless because it was not
perfected at the proper time. For example, a security interest not per-
fected at the time of bankruptcy may be avoided by the debtor's trustee
under the "strong-arm" provision of the Bankruptcy Act.12 9 Similarly,
a security interest securing an antecedent debt may be set aside as a
voidable preference if it was perfected not earlier than four months be-
fore bankruptcy and if, at the time of perfection, the secured party had
reason to believe that his debtor was insolvent.3 0
The drafters of the 1972 Uniform Commercial Code amendments
wanted to assure an individual with a security interest in fixtures priority
over his debtor's trustee in bankruptcy.' 31  Since a security interest
unperfected at the date of commencement of bankruptcy proceedings
can be set aside by the trustee under the Bankruptcy Act because it
could have been set aside by a hypothetical lien creditor, 3 2 the revision
committee provided that perfection by any method permitted by Article
9 would be sufficient protection against subsequent liens on the real
estate obtained by legal or equitable proceedings. 33 Perfection accom-
plished by a method other than fixture filing will thus protect a secured
party against the trustee in bankruptcy.
Compliance with section 9-313(4)(d) would permit the secured
party to prevail over the trustee although priority would be accorded the
real estate interest if the financing statement were filed in the chattel
records rather than in the real estate records.' Under present Califor-
nia law, by contrast, an improper filing eliminates the secured party's
priority. 135 The real estate encumbrancer gains nothing by such a rule
128. Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(5) (a) with cases cited at note
63 supra.
129. 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
130. Id. §§ 96(a), (b). When his security interest is set aside, the secured party
is relegated to the status of an unsecured creditor, who generally recovers only seven
cents on the dollar. S. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION
391 (1967).
131. Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 14, at 1075; see Panel Discussion, supra
note 1, at 316.
132. 11 U.S.C. § 110() (1970).
133. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(4)(d). The language in this subsec-
tion, "lien . . . by legal or equitable proceedings," derives from Section 70(c) of the
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970). It is used in order to encompass the judg-
ment liens described therein. Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 14, at 1075.
134. See Coogan, supra note 1, at 500-01.
135. Cf. Sequoia Mach., Inc. v. Jarrett, 410 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1969).
favoring the trustee in bankruptcy over the junior interest of the secured
party. A provision voiding the security interest may, however, improve
the position of general creditors. Adoption of revised section 9-
313(4)(d) in California would not have affected the relationship be-
tween real estate encumbrancers and chattel secured parties. Its adop-
tion at this time would permit the interest arising through a voluntary
security agreement to prevail over the creditor who, but for the proper-
ty's affixation, would have been subordinate to the secured party. 36
California should adopt revised section 9-313(4)(d) and permit the
secured party to protect himself against unsecured parties and therefore
the trustee in bankruptcy.
Even after adoption of section 9-313, however, it would be difficult
to determine whether a security interest in a fixture had been perfected
for purposes of section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. There are two tests
for perfection in section 60--one for personalty and one for real proper-
ty. There is no specific provision for fixtures. 137 If a fixture is a chattel,
the test for perfection is whether the secured party has priority over lien
creditors. If he does, his security interest is perfected for section 60
purposes. If a fixture is real estate, the secured party must have priority
over bona fide purchasers of land for his security interest to be perfect-
ed. If a fixture is realty, however, new Uniform Commercial Code
section 9-313 loses its punch: it will not protect a chattel mortgagee
against the trustee in bankruptcy unless the chattel mortgagee makes a
timely fixture filing.
Unless the Bankruptcy Act is amended to make the section 60 test
for personalty applicable to fixtures, the courts will have to decide which
test to employ.'3 8 The drafters believe that the personalty test is appro-
priate for fixtures since the purpose of section 9-313 is to regulate
conflicts between realty interests and fixture interests.3 9 As Professor
Kripke argues:
It is partially because of this problem . . . that the Code speaks
of "goods including fixtures," thus emphasizing the chattel aspects,
and rejecting the suggestion . . . that the proper way to talk about
a fixture is as a part of the real estate to which certain parties may
have severance rights.' 40
136. In other areas of the code adopted in California, the unexpected change in
the locale or use of goods which renders the earlier filing improper does not destroy
the secured parties' priority over later perfected security interests and unsecured credi-
tors. CAL. COMM. CODE § 9401(3) (West Supp. 1975).
137. See 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1970).
138. Such an amendment was proposed to the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States on October 28, 1972 by the National Bankruptcy Conference.
Coogan, supra note 1, at 502 n.74. This amendment has not been enacted into law.
139. Id. at 502-03.
140. Kripke, supra note 114, at 311.
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Thus, if section 9-313(4)(d) had been enacted in California and the
reasoning of the drafters followed, any security interest in fixtures
perfected at least four months prior to the commencement of bankrupt-
cy proceedings by any method permitted under division 9 of the Cali-
fornia Commercial Code would be secure against the trustee in bank-
ruptcy as well as any other subsequent lienholder who has obtained an
interest by legal or equitable means.
Readily Removable Goods
In California, security interests in readily removable goods which
become fixtures are treated no differently from other goods.141 Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, however, if local law determines that
readily removable factory and office machines and readily removable
replacements of domestic appliances which are consumer goods are
fixtures, a fixture filing will not be necessary to protect security interests
in these goods. 42 Perfection prior to affixation by any method permitted
under Article 9 will give the secured party priority over owners and
encumbrancers of land.' 43
Perfection of security interests in factory or office machines may be
accomplished by filing in the chattel records.' 44 While the drafters
clearly intended that purchase money security interests in replacements
of domestic appliances which are consumer goods be perfected without
filing, 45 the language of section 9-302(1)(d) may cause confusion: a
financing statement need not be filed to perfect "a purchase money
security interest in consumer goods; but. . . fixture filing is required
for priority over conflicting interests in fixtures to the extent provided in
section 9-313 .'46 Since section 9-313(4)(c) permits perfection by any
method permitted under Article 9, however, filing should not be re-
quired for purchase money security interests in consumer goods.
The Review Committee adopted this provision because it is often
difficult to know whether readily removable home appliances and facto-
ry or office machines have become fixtures. 147 A secured party who
erroneously believes that his collateral has become a fixture would
normally make a fixture filing. This would protect him against real
estate interests, but will leave him vulnerable to the claims of chattel
141. Oakland Bank of Say. v. California Pressed Brick Co., 183 Cal. 295, 191 P.
524 (1920).
142. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313 (4) (c).
143. Id.
144. See id. § 9-302.
145. Id. § 9-313 Comment 4(d); Panel Discussion, supra note 3, at 516-17.
146. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302(1) (d).
147. See Prather, A Savings Association View of the Review Committee's Pro-
posals, 25 Bus. LAw. 327, 330 (1969).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
secured parties and his debtor's trustee in bankruptcy. 148 Under the
revised section 9-313 the secured party does not have to decide whether
his collateral remains personalty or becomes a fixture nor does he have
to go to the expense of a double filing. He is assured of protection
against all conflicting interests if he files a financing statement in the
chattel records prior to affixation.149
Only replacements of domestic appliances which are consumer
goods and readily removable factory or office machines come within the
ambit of revised section 9-313(4) (c).15° This special protection does
not extend to appliances which become affixed to a newly constructed
building because to do so might inhibit real estate financing.''
One problem with revised section 9-313(4)(c) is that it leaves too
much room for dispute as to what goods are "readily removable," what
goods are "replacements of domestic appliances," what goods are "fac-
tory or office machines," what is a factory, and what is an office. 52 The
Code-defined word "equipment" could be substituted for "factory or
office machines,"' '53 to alleviate some of these difficulties. Nevertheless,
another problem would arise from the different treatment accorded to
domestic appliances which are consumer goods and those which are
equipment. Consider the example of an appliance retailer who sells the
owner of a duplex two dishwashers on an installment contract. Under
revised section 9-313(4)(c) a purchase money security interest is per-
fected without filing as to the replacement the debtor installs in his own
apartment because it is a consumer good.' However, a fixture filing is
necessary to perfect a security interest in the dishwasher that the debtor
uses to replace an older built-in model in the apartment that he rents to
others because it is equipment. 155
Thus, should it adopt section 9-312(4) (c), California might wish
to eliminate the distinction between domestic appliances that are con-
sumer goods and those that are equipment. 156 In any case, the state
148. See Coogan, supra note 1, at 497.
149. Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 315. A security interest in these readily
removable goods will have priority over construction mortgages. Coogan, supra note 1,
at 499. Factory and office machines are not always financed as part of a construction
mortgage, and it is reasonable to expect the mortgagee to be alert to conflicting chattel
financing of these machines. Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 14, at 1076.
150. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313 (4) (c).
151. Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 14, at 1076.
152. Coogan, supra note 1, at 490.
153. When Section 9-313(4)(c) was introduced, the Code-defined term "equip-
ment" was substituted for the phrase "factory or office machines." A.B. 2510 (1973-
74), as amended, Jan. 10, 1974.
154. Funk, supra note 10, at 1476.
155. Id.
156. This would not require the elimination of the distinctions found in other sec-
tions of the Code.
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legislature would need to create definitions for the terminology used. If
the task is too great, California could enact section 9-313 without this
subsection.
A Proposed Modification to Avoid "Secret Liens"
In most cases under California law, a secured party cannot afford
to perfect his interest because a legal description, as presently re-
quired,5 7 demands the services of an attorney, whose fee may be very
modest for a typical real estate transaction, but out of proportion to the
creation of a security interest in equipment or consumer goods involving
limited capital. 158 Fixture filing as permitted under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code provides an economically feasible alternative for the se-
cured party because a legal description is unnecessary.1 9
The California Land Title Association believes that section 9-313
would make possible the creation of "secret liens" on real estate:
secret in the sense that their existence, effect and priority would
not be ascertainable by a purchaser or encumbrancer of the parti-
cular real property by searching the public records which impart
constructive notice as to matters affecting title to real property, nor
could these things be determined from such records by title com-
panies. 80
Since California uses the alphabetical system of recording interests
in real property, all instruments executed in the name of a grantee
during his term of ownership provide constructive notice to all subse-
quent creditors and purchasers.' 6' A fixture filing, indexed in California
under the names of the debtor, the secured party, and the record owner
of the real estate would be easily found in a title search. The alphabeti-
cal system, therefore, precludes hidden liens, so long as there is a fixture
filing. Furthermore, since a street address or other common name is
sufficient for a contract of sale,' 62 there is no reason why it should not
be sufficient for fixture filing.
However, as to readily removable replacements of domestic appli-
ances which are consumer goods, secret liens may in fact be possible
because perfection can be accomplished without filing. 63 The real estate
encumbrancer might also have to search the chattel records to find out
157. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
158. Coogan, supra note 1, at 491.
159. See notes 73-95 and accompanying text supra.
160. Letter from Robert D. Crawford (Chairman, California Land Title Associa-
tion) to Sean E. McCarthy (Assistant Legislative Counsel, California Land Title Asso-
ciation), March 18, 1974.
161. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1213 (West 1954).
162. See 1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, CuRRENT LAW OF CALIFoRNIA REAL ESTATE,
29-30 (1965).
163. See text accompanying note 145 supra.
whether there are security interests in readily removable replacements of
factory or office machines. 64 While it is reasonable to expect real estate
encumbrancers to be aware of conflicting interests in readily removable
office equipment,165 and while the revision committee wanted to avoid a
requirement of fixture filing for every replacement of a stove or dish-
washer in the home,' 66 section 9-313(4) (c) could be eliminated to
facilitate the transfer of real property.
On the other hand, elimination of section 9-313(4)(c) would
place a tremendous burden on the secured party who does not know
about the intended affixation. He would be required to file in both the
real estate and chattel records to protect his security interest' 67 whenever
the collateral consisted of goods designed to be used with the real estate
either as built-ins or as attachable but otherwise freestanding objects.
Today such things as heaters, air conditioners, refrigerators, freezers,
washers, dryers, stoves, and dishwashers are household goods falling
within this category. The same burden of duplicate filing would arise if
the secured party's collateral consisted of readily removable office equip-
ment. With technological advances the class of goods which may be
built-in or attachable but freestanding will undoubtedly increase.
Even if section 9-313(4)(c) were adopted it would not solve all of
the secured party's problems. While no filing would be required for a
security interest in readily removable replacements of domestic appli-
ances which are consumer goods, the secured party would not be
protected: (1) against anyone if the appliance were not a replacement
but instead an original, or (2) against anyone if the appliance were
equipment and not a consumer good.16 8
Better protection could be afforded the secured party and the real
estate encumbrancer by the following suggested provision:
Security interests in consumer goods or equipment designed to be
used with real estate as built-ins or as attachable but otherwise
freestanding goods may be perfected against all subsequent con-
flicting interests in the goods by a fixture filing. Perfection shall be
effective against all conflicting interests, real and personal, whether
or not such consumer goods or equipment have become fixtures. A
fixture filing shall not make any consumer good or equipment
which remains freestanding a fixture.
This provision, offered as a substitute for section 9-313(4)(c),
would avoid ambiguities because it uses the Code-defined words
164. See text accompanying note 149 supra.
165. Preliminary Draft No. 2, supra note 14, at 1076.
166. See Kripke, supra note 114, at 305.
167. See Coogan, supra note 1, at 497.
168. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313 Comment 4(d); see text accom-
panying note 155 supra.
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"goods"' 69 and "equipment."'170 Real estate encumbrancers would be
satisfied because adoption of this subsection would eliminate the possi-
bility of secret liens against the real property. The secured party would
also benefit because he could avoid the cost of filing in both the
personalty and realty records.
If the goods do not become fixtures, the secured party's burden will
not have been unreasonably increased. Under existing California law,
when the secured party sells a stove or refrigerator, for example, he must
determine whether it will be installed in the purchaser's home or in an
apartment rented to others so that the chattel financing statement can be
filed in the proper place-in the Secretary of State's office if the
collateral is equipment, 17 but, if the collateral consists of consumer
goods, in the county where the debtor resides or where the goods are
kept if the debtor is not a California resident. 72 Thus,, even under the
present law, the secured party may need to know where goods which do
not become fixtures are to be installed.
Since chattel filing will remain an effective method of perfecting
interests so long as the goods do not become fixtures, refinancing will
perhaps be more expensive because non-real estate creditors will be
required to search both the personalty and realty records for security
interests in goods that are designed to be used either as built-ins or as
attachable freestanding objects. 73 It is submitted, however, that it is
more important to encourage the extension of credit for home and office
improvements than it is to provide inexpensive refinancing of improve-
ments that have already been made.
A Fresh Start
The problem remaining in revised section 9-313 is that it fails to
provide clear definitions. While the drafters of the Uniform Commercial
Code avoided for the most part the use of words whose prior connota-
tions might interfere with Code interpretations (such as chattel mortga-
169. Compare UNioRm COMmERCiAL CODE § 9-105(h) with CAL. COMM. CODE
§ 9105(f) (West 1964) and CAL. COMM. CODE § 9105(h) (West Supp. 1975) (effective
Jan. 1, 1976).
170. Compare UNiPORM COMMERCAL CODE § 9-109(2) with CAL. COMM. CODE
§ 9109(2) (West 1964) and CAL. COMM. CODE § 9109(2) (West Supp. 1975) (effective
Jan. 1, 1976).
171. Compare CAL. COMM. CODE § 9401(1)(c) (West 1964) with CAL. COMM.
CODE § 9401(1) (c) (West Supp. 1975) (effective Jan. 1, 1976).
172. Compare CAL. COMM. CODE § 9401(1)(a) (West 1964) with CAL. COMM.
CODE § 9401(1)(a) (West Supp. 1975) (effective Jan. 1, 1976).
173. The institutional lender who takes a security interest in all of his debtor's
equipment as collateral for a loan will be obliged to search both sets of records. While
this may make credit for expansion of the business more expensive, it is unlikely that
this method of financing is used to make office improvements.
gee) and created instead new words of art (such as secured party,
security interest, perfection, and attachment'), the word "fixture,"
with its rich though confused history,175 was incorporated into the Code
by references in numerous sections. 176 The new Article 9, like the old,
gives the states little help in determining which Code category goods
belong. The Code says: "goods are 'fixtures' when they become so re-
lated to particular real estate than an interest in them arises under real
estate law."'177 In California, a determination that an object is a fixture
automatically determines priorities. 78  As a result no coherent defini-
tion of the word exists which would be suitable for Code purposes. To
give California a fresh start in the area of priorities, the term fixture
should be replaced by a new term of art limited in application to divi-
sion 9 of the Commercial Code.'79
A simple, concrete definition is necessary.18 0 A workable definition
might be as follows:
174. As Professors Lakin and Berger explain, Article 9 "creates a new vocabulary
to take the place of the historical terms which are properly relegated to the archives
of legal history . . . mhe draftsmen of Article 9 deliberately developed completely new
terminology having no common law or statutory roots to avoid possible confusion. Fur-
thermore, they obliterated all historical distinctions as to names and forms of security
devices and created a new terminology and concept of secured financing relevant to the
needs of the modern-day businessman." L. LAKIN & H. BERGER, A GUIDE TO SECURED
TRANSACTIONS 67 (1970). See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-201(37), 9-105(m),
-203, -303.
175. See text accompanying notes 29-58 supra.
176. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-302(1)(d), -401(1), -401(5),
-402(1), -403 (6), -403 (7), -405(2).
177. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313(l)(a).
178. See text accompanying notes 29-68 supra.
179. Section 7 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, predecessor of section 9-313
of the Uniform Commercial Code, did not use the term "fixture." Instead, it substituted
the phrase "goods attached to the realty." The drafters of Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code explained in comment 2 of section 2-107 that they did not use the
term "fixture" because of its vagueness. The original draftsmen of Article 9 followed
section 7 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act and also avoided the use of the word.
When Article 9 was modified in 1956 the new draftsmen incorporated the old term "fix-
ture," apparently unaware of the reasons why it had been originally rejected. Coogan,
supra note 1, at 486-87.
180. The Review Committee proposed a definition of fixture in its first published
draft: "Goods are 'fixtures' when they are so related to particular real estate that under
the law of this state other than this Act an interest in the goods would pass as part
of the real estate under a conveyance or mortgage thereof without specific mention of
the goods, except as stated in this paragraph. Where ordinary building materials are
incorporated in an improvement upon land, which improvement is itself not a fixture,
the materials are real estate and not a fixture. An improvement upon land is not a fix-
ture unless it is readily removable from the land. Readily removable factory and office
machines and readily remoavble replacements of domestic appliances are not fixtures.
Where the debtor is a tenant, goods which he has a right to remove are not fixtures
but personal property. Standing timber and growing crops and oil, gas, and minerals
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
September 1975] UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SECIION 9-313 263
(1) Goods are adjuncts to real property when they are permanently
attached to real property, as by means of plastic, nails, bolts, or
screws, or otherwise affixed with a material having a bonding
strength equal to that of plastic, nails, bolts, or screws' s8
(2) Goods which are incorporated as an integral part of a structure
in the manner of lumber, tile, cement, glass, metalwork, and the
like are real property unless the structure itself is an adjunct to
real property.
While this definition is flexible enough to accomodate technologi-
cal change, it is sufficiently concrete to avoid most litigation. Condition-
al vendors and other secured praties, as well as real estate interests,
should be satisfied with a definition that eliminates uncertainty. The
confusing connotations associated with the history of the word "fixture"
would be avoided by the use of the new term "adjunct to real property,"
and the last stumbling block to adoption of section 9-313 would be
overcome.
Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code's fixture provisions
would have given California a clean slate in this area of commercial law.
It would have provided a coherent basis for real property owners and
encumbrancers and chattel mortgagees to determine their respective
rights in the same object. It is most unfortunate that section 9-313 has
been rejected by California. The legislature should reconsider its deci-
sion.
Monica R. Salusky*
before severance are not fixtures." Preliminary Draft No. 1, supra note 12, at 344. The
primary problem with this definition is the need to look to state case law to determine
which goods pass as part of the real estate under a conveyance without specific mention.
Reliance upon a construction of conveyance test would not only preclude uniformity, but
would leave California's fixture definition in the same confused state it is in today.
181. See CAL .Cirv. CoDE § 660 (West 1954).
* J.D., 1975, Hastings College of the Law. The author wishes to thank Pro-
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